


INITIUM

STRATEGIC MEMORANDUM

ALTERNATIVE WARFARE

FEBRUARY 2026



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Historically, defense has largely followed two trajectories, the first is the incremental optimization of existing systems. Aside from simply improving performance in isolation, this has been, and continues to be, a requirement for responding to and overcoming adversarial countermeasures: As any system evolves, adversaries update their countermeasures to neutralize the threat, thereby making continuous improvement a requirement to remain competitive.

The second trajectory is the pursuit of breakthrough technologies and frontier science. While these efforts are what shapes the battlefield landscape, they are inherently uncertain, capital-intensive, and protracted in their path to operational viability. Breakthroughs cannot be scheduled, and often emerge from adjacent or unrelated research with later military application.

More recently, a third trajectory has emerged: the automation and software integration of existing capabilities. The application of cumulative data and artificial intelligence is now a requirement for maximizing performance. While necessary, however, automation presupposes existing structures to optimize, and cannot, in and of itself, define them.


Initium operates at a fourth layer: Rather than refining mature systems or building our core model on speculative scientific leaps, we focus on introducing new conditions faster than adversarial iteration loops and procurement timelines are able to produce solutions.

THE LIMITS OF ITERATIVE SUPERIORITY

After capabilities are deployed, adversaries respond by developing countermeasures intended to degrade or neutralise their effectiveness, in response to which the systems must adapt to respond to these countermeasures. This dynamic produces an ongoing cycle of refinement: systems are improved, countermeasures emerge, and further improvements are introduced in response.

Incremental improvement is therefore not optional. It is a structural requirement of sustained military capability. Sensors must become more precise, interceptors more reliable, electronic protection more resilient, and platforms more survivable. Without continuous iteration, even advanced systems quickly degrade in their operational relevance.

However, when facing technologically comparable adversaries, incremental improvements rarely produce decisive advantage. More often, they serve only to maintain parity within an established equilibrium.



CASE STUDY: UKRAINE


Between 2022 and 2025, the Ukraine war was the first conflict in which drones shifted from “strategic enablers” into material impact weapon systems, produced, fielded, and iterated fast enough to shape battlefield dynamics. Over 1.2 million drones were delivered in the first 11 months of 2024, and 2025 showed nearly 820,000 video-confirmed drone hits.

While drones possess several inherent advantages as weapon systems: they are low cost, high manufacturability, high control and capable of delivering precision effects without risking the operator’s life, what made them so effective on the battlefield in Ukraine was the lack of ready solutions. Although drones have been explored for war for years now, the scale and breadth of their application in Ukraine was something adversaries had not anticipated or prepared for.

This initial lack of preparedness created a substantial operational window. Small FPV drones costing only a few hundred dollars were able to destroy vehicles worth hundreds of thousands or millions, while larger unmanned systems conducted reconnaissance, artillery targeting, and long-range strikes. The result was a battlefield environment in which inexpensive, rapidly produced systems imposed disproportionate costs on traditional military platforms.

Since then, significant effort has been directed toward developing countermeasures. A growing ecosystem of counter-drone technologies now exists, ranging from interceptors to microwave arrays. These systems will undoubtedly improve in both effectiveness and scale of deployment over time.

However, the development and deployment of countermeasures is constrained by several structural factors. Adversaries must first identify the emerging threat, develop technological responses, navigate procurement timelines, manufacture the required systems, and ultimately deploy them to operational units. Each stage introduces delays in which there exists a critical window that allows such systems to exert disproportionate influence on the battlefield. In Ukraine, drones and drone swarms have repeatedly occupied this window, shaping battlefield dynamics before countermeasures could fully mature.



STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Initium's strategic doctrine centres on controlling the dynamics of technological adaptation in modern conflict. Rather than competing solely through incremental improvements to established systems, the objective is to introduce new operational problems faster than adversaries are able to analyse, counter, and adapt to them.

In such an environment, advantage derives not only from the capabilities themselves, but from the tempo at which they evolve. By developing and deploying new systems in rapid succession, the pace of change can exceed the speed at which adversarial organisations are able to produce effective responses. The result is a competitive dynamic in which adversaries remain in a continuous state of reaction to conditions that are already evolving.

This dynamic allows the competitive cycle of capability and countermeasure to be anticipated in advance. Rather than waiting for adversaries to develop responses, potential countermeasures can be modelled during the design process itself. Successive iterations can therefore be prepared before adversarial adaptations emerge, ensuring that responses are met immediately with new capabilities that restore the original advantage.

Control the pace of adaptation so that adversaries are always responding to yesterday's battlefield.